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Abstract
Right-wing populism has a long tradition in Switzerland.  Nevertheless, only little is known about how 
populist messages in the media contribute to the success of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and to the ac-
ceptance of the party’s anti-immigration policies.  In this study, we combine data from a large media content 
analysis (including newspapers and TV news shows) with data from a panel-survey in order to address this 
research gap.  Thereby we differentiate between effects driven by the content and the form of right-wing 
populist communication.  While right-wing populist content depicts immigrants and the political elite as a 
threat to the Swiss people, populist style evokes the sense of a crisis by emotionalizing and dramatizing 
the message.  Populist style is therefore assumed to increase the persuasiveness of populist claims.  The 
results of this study suggest that this is the case only for some voters, while it backfires for others.
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The term crisis has a high popularity in re-
cent politics, be it with regard to refugees, 
the media, or democracy. It seems that 
especially populist actors profit from this 
state. The proclamation of a crisis helps 
them to put forward their drastic poli-
cies and is considered as a key element of 
populist politics (Moffitt, 2015). Populist 
actors like to portray themselves as un-
political persons, who are urged to take 
action in light of the desperate situation 
(Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000). They turn 
politics into a campaign to save the coun-
try (Canovan, 1999).
In order to evoke a sense of a crisis, 
populist actors rely on communication 
styles such as dramatization, emotional-
ization, and absolutism (e. g., Betz, 1993; 
Bos & Brants, 2014; Bracciale & Martel-
la, 2017). These style elements are often 
considered as a key feature of populist 
communication. Compared to substantial 
populist statements, which reflect the key 
ideas of the populist ideology, such style 
elements are not populist per se (Wirth 
et al., 2016). Nevertheless, they help pop-
ulist actors to gain attention and spread 
their messages (e. g., Mazzoleni, Stewart, & 
Horsfield, 2003).
Little is known about the effects of the 
populist crisis rhetoric in the media on 
citizens’ attitudes. Is a populist message 
more persuasive when it is emotionalized 
or dramatized? And are all voters equally 
susceptible to the populist crisis rhetoric? 
Previous research suggests that populist 
style elements may increase the persua-
siveness of a populist message for certain 
voter segments (Bos, van der Brug, & de 
Vreese, 2013; Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 
2017b). As experimental studies only show 
short-term effects in response to a single 
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media stimulus, more research is needed 
to answer these questions. A recent field 
study (Wirz et al., 2018) did not find any 
additional effects of populist styles over 
the effects of populist and anti-immigrant 
statements on emotions and cognitions 
toward immigrants. However, this study 
did not differentiate between different 
groups of participants, as the experimental 
studies did. It therefore remains an open 
question if populist styles can increase 
the persuasiveness of right-wing populist 
messages for certain voters.
The present study aims to address 
this research gap using data from Switzer-
land. The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is of-
ten considered as a textbook example of a 
right-wing populist party (e. g., Albertazzi, 
2008). Under the former leader Christoph 
Blocher, the party has almost doubled its 
vote share and became the largest party of 
the country. Some of the SVP’s poster cam-
paigns in referenda gained international 
attention due to their provocative nature1. 
In the Swiss media, the party has taken a 
dominant position (Udris, 2012). Never-
theless, there is so far no systematic anal-
ysis of the effects of right-wing populist 
communication in the media on citizens’ 
attitudes. 
With the present study, we thus aim to 
make a twofold contribution. By combin-
ing data from a content analysis of the im-
migration debate in Swiss newspapers and 
TV news shows with data from a panel- 
survey, we analyze the effects of right-
wing populist communication (i. e., the 
combination of right-wing and populist 
statements as well as populist style) on cit-
izens’ attitudes towards immigrants, their 
support for anti-immigration policies, and 
their vote probability for the SVP. On the 
one hand, this improves the understand-
ing of how the populist crisis rhetoric may 
increase the persuasiveness of right-wing 
populist messages in a real-world setting, 
and on the other hand, it investigates the 
effect of right-wing populist communica-
1 See, for example, this article in the Huffington 
Post: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/glo-
bal-risk-insights/switzerland-trump-chris-
toph-blocher-_b_9517190.html (last visited 
on June 4, 2018).
tion in the media on Swiss citizens’ prefer-
ences for the SVP and its policies.
The results of our study show that 
right-wing populist communication may 
affect attitudes toward immigrants, the 
support for anti-immigration policies, as 
well as the vote probability for the SVP. 
However, not all effects are evidence of 
persuasion. While individuals who are 
supportive of the populist ideology can 
be convinced by the combination of anti-
immi grant statements and populist style, 
we find a reversed effect for individuals 
who reject the populist ideology. The find-
ings of this study thus suggest that populist 
crisis rhetoric in the media may mobilize 
voters who are inclined towards the popu-
list ideology, and that it may contribute to 
a polarization of the Swiss electorate.
1 Literature Review
1.1 Right-wing Populism in Switzerland
The Swiss political system provides ideal 
opportunity structures for the emergence 
of populist communication. Indeed, right-
wing populism has a strong tradition since 
the Swiss People’s Party (SVP)’s upraise in 
the 1990s (Ernst, Engesser, & Esser, 2017b). 
The SVP is the largest right-wing populist 
party in Western Europe and can count as 
a textbook example for populist parties. 
Under its former leader Christoph Bloch-
er, the party has almost doubled its vote 
share; in 2003 it became Switzerland’s larg-
est party. Much of this success is attributed 
to the charismatic appeal of Blocher and to 
the radicalized rhetoric against immigra-
tion and EU integration that he introduced 
(Albertazzi, 2008; Skenderovic, 2007). 
1.2 Right-wing populist communication
The communication of right-wing pop-
ulist parties reflects their political ideas 
(Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Stromback, & 
Vreese, 2016), which are influenced by the 
populist ideology on the one hand, and 
by a right-wing political orientation on 
the other hand. Populism as a thin-cen-
tered ideology describes a struggle over 
the structure of power in society; the 
pure and virtuous people feel deprived of 
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their rights and values by the corrupt and 
self-serving elite (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 
2008) and want their will to be the ultimate 
say in politics (Mudde, 2004). On a com-
municative level, these ideas are expressed 
by praising the people, blaming the elite, 
and demanding more sovereignty for the 
people (Wirth et al., 2016). We refer to 
such expressions as populist statements. 
As populism is a thin-centered ideology 
(Kaltwasser, 2011; Mudde, 2004), it can be 
combined with other ideologies. Right-
wing populism combines populism with 
nativism (Mudde, 2007). Nativism is the 
idea that a nation state should only be in-
habited by locals and that people or ideas 
from outside present a threat to the state 
(Mudde, 2007, 2010). On a communicative 
level, nativism is reflected by statements 
that blame or discredit immigrants and ex-
clude them from the people (Wirth et al., 
2016). We refer to such expressions as anti- 
immigrant statements. 
Right-wing populist communication 
can thus be understood as a combination 
of populist statements and anti-immigrant 
statements. The pure people are vertical-
ly distinguished from a corrupt elite, and 
horizontally distinguished from others 
who threaten their values and wellbeing. 
As right-wing populism combines an an-
ti-elitist and an exclusionist perspective, it 
can also be referred to as complete popu-
lism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Reinemann, 
Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 
2016). This communicative repertoire can 
be enriched by populist communication 
styles. 
Several scholars have measured man-
ifestations of (right-wing) populist com-
munication in traditional or new media 
(Akkerman, 2011; Cranmer, 2011; Enges-
ser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017; Hame-
leers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017; Jagers & Wal-
grave, 2007; Rooduijn, 2013). The focus, 
thereby, has mostly been on identifying 
populist statements and anti-immigrant 
statements in order to classify actors as 
more or less (right-wing) populist. Less 
attention has been devoted to the iden-
tification of populist style elements (see 
Bos & Brants, 2014; Bracciale & Martella, 
2017 for exceptions). Although commu-
nication styles such as emotionalization, 
dramatization, absolutism and colloquial 
language are often associated with popu-
lism (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Betz, 
1993; Canovan, 1999; Hawkins, 2009; Maz-
zoleni et al., 2003; Taggart, 2000), they 
are not direct expressions of the populist 
ideology and may have other causes, for 
example media logic. Their use does thus 
not classify actors as more or less populist. 
Nevertheless, a recent study by Wettstein 
et al. (2018) demonstrates that populist 
style elements are most likely to occur in 
newspaper articles when populist actors 
are a speaker. We therefore consider such 
style elements to be an element of right-
wing populist communication and refer to 
them as populist styles (see Table 1). It is 
the purpose of this study to investigate if 
the combination of substantial right-wing 
populist statements (populist statements 
or anti-immigrant statements) with pop-
ulist styles increases the persuasiveness of 
the former. 
In Switzerland, especially the SVP is 
known to make use of populist commu-
nication, as empirical studies show. A 
recent study by Bernhard (2017) has an-
alysed the use of populist statements by 
Swiss political parties in their newspapers. 
The results suggest that the SVP, together 
with the more regionally focused parties 
Ticino League (Lega) and Geneva Citi-
zens Movement (MCG), make more pop-
ulist statements than established parties 
(the Social Democrats, Liberals, Christian 
Democrats and Greens). Similarly, Ernst, 
Engesser, and Esser (2017a) found that the 
SVP makes more populist statements on 
Facebook and Twitter than the established 
parties (see also Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, 
Blassnig, & Esser, 2017). These finding are 
consistent with results of an earlier study 
by Cranmer (2011), who found that in a 
media context, the SVP employed more 
populist statements and anti-immigrant 
statements than any other party in Swit-
zerland. Of the nation-wide relevant par-
ties in Switzerland, the SVP is thus the one 
that is most inclined to use right-wing 
populist communication. 
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1.3 Effects of right-wing populist content 
and style
Several studies demonstrate that anti- 
immigrant statements and populist state-
ments increase negative attitudes toward 
immigrants (Arendt, Marquart, & Matthes, 
2015; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017; Schemer, 
2012; Schmuck & Matthes, 2017; Sheets, 
Bos, & Boomgaarden, 2015). Much less 
is known about the effects of populist 
styles. However, two studies suggest that 
the persuasiveness of populist and anti- 
immigrant statements increases when 
they are combined with an emotional-
ized style (Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 
2017a; Matthes & Marquart, 2013). More 
generally, research on the formal presen-
tation of news has shown that although 
style elements such as emotionalization 
and dramatization negatively influence 
the perceived quality of news (Kleemans, 
Vettehen, Beentjes, & Eisinga, 2017), they 
positively affect arousal and attention 
(Grabe, Zhou, Lang, & Bolls, 2000), and 
may also increase memory for some news 
stories (Grabe, Lang, & Zhao, 2003). The 
use of populist style elements may thus 
increase the attention to anti-immigrant 
and populist statements in a news item 
as well as the perceived relevance of the 
news. We can therefore assume that the 
exposure to anti-immigrant and populist 
statements in news coverage on the issue 
of migration increases negative attitudes 
toward immigrants, and that this effect 
will be even larger when such statements 
are combined with populist style.
 › H1a: The more often individuals are 
exposed to right-wing populist content 
(i. e., anti-immigrant and/or populist 
statements) in their media diets, the 
more negative will their attitudes to-
ward immigrants become.
 › H2a: The more often individuals are ex-
posed to a combination of populist and 
anti-immigrant statements with popu-
list style in their media diets, the more 
negative will their attitudes toward im-
migrants become.
The operationalization of negative atti-
tudes toward immigrants varies consid-
erably between and within studies. While 
some studies aim to depict what people 
think or feel about immigrants (e. g., Wirz 
et al., 2018), others also include support 
for immigration policies (e. g., Matthes & 
Schmuck, 2017). In the Swiss context, 
where people can vote for immigration 
policies in referenda, it is very useful to 
distinguish between attitudes toward im-
migrants (consisting of cognitions and 
emotions toward immigrants, see Schem-
er, 2009), and support for immigration pol-
icies. As the extant literature did not fully 
distinguish between the two concepts so 
far, we can assume that the assumptions 
we made for anti-immigrant attitudes are 
also valid for the support of anti-immi-
grant policies.
 › H1b: The more often individuals are 
exposed to right-wing populist content 
(i. e., anti-immigrant and/or populist 
statements) in their media diets, the 
stronger will their support for anti-im-
migrant policies become.
 › H2b: The more often individuals are 
exposed to a combination of populist 
and anti-immigrant statements with 
Table 1: Populist Key Messages  
and Populist Styles
Populist Key Messages
Anti-Elitism The elite in general or specific elites are des-
cribed with negative attributes (e. g., corrupt, 
incompetent), as a threat or burden to the people, 
as responsible for problems, as not belonging to/
caring for the people.
People Centrism The people are described with positive attributes 
(e. g., competent, virtuous), as responsible for  
a good development, as monolithic. The speaker 
describes himself as part of the people/caring 
for the people.
Restoring 
Sovereignty
It is argued in favor of more power to the people 
or less power to the elites.
Populist Styles
Emotionalization Use of emotional language, references to 
feelings
Dramatization Using exaggerations, war rhetoric, describing the 
situation as an emergency, declaring a scandal
Absolutism Presenting something as the only conceivable 
option
Colloquial 
Language
Use of vulgar or slang language, sarcasm, 
nicknames
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populist style in their media diets, the 
stronger will their support for anti-im-
migrant policies become.
Some studies also demonstrate effects of 
right-wing populist communication on 
vo ting intentions for right-wing popu-
list parties (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 
2007; Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2018; 
Sheets et al., 2016). These authors argue 
that anti-immigrant statements highlight 
the salience of immigration as a problem 
and lead to more support for parties that 
are perceived as providing solutions for 
this problem. Further, populist statements 
may increase political discontent and lead 
to more support for parties that are per-
ceived as an alternative to the political es-
tablishment. We can thus assume that the 
exposure to right-wing populist content 
in the media does increase the support 
for right-wing populist parties in general, 
and in the Swiss context for the SVP in par-
ticular. Although the previous literature 
makes no assumption about the effects 
of populist style on voting intentions, we 
assume that the underlying process is the 
same as described for effects on anti-im-
migrant attitudes; the use of populist style 
elements in combination with anti-immi-
grant or populist statements will increase 
the relevance of the message, which leads 
to a higher salience of the issue and thus 
may increase the preference for a party 
that promises a solution. Therefore, we 
postulate that a combination of populist 
content with populist style will increase 
the vote probability for the SVP.
 › H1c: The more often individuals are 
exposed to right-wing populist content 
(i. e., anti-immigrant and/or populist 
statements) in their media diets, the 
higher will their vote probability for the 
SVP become.
 › H2c: The more often individuals are ex-
posed to a combination of populist and 
anti-immigrant statements with popu-
list style in their media diets, the higher 
will their vote probability for the SVP 
become.
Most studies on the effects of right-wing 
populist communication did not find ef-
fects across the board, but rather for spe-
cific voter segments. It seems that individ-
uals with lower education (e.g. Matthes & 
Marquart, 2013; Matthes & Schmuck, 
2017), lower issue-specific knowledge 
(Schemer, 2012), lower identification with 
those who are blamed (Hameleers et al., 
2017b), higher identification with popu-
list actors (Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017), 
and higher political cynicism (Bos et al., 
2013) are more susceptible to right-wing 
populist appeals. Most of these character-
istics seem to reflect individuals’ support 
of populist ideas. A study by Müller et al. 
(2017) has shown that pervious levels of 
support for the populist ideology deter-
mine individuals’ responses to populist 
media content: individuals who support 
the populist ideology develop higher lev-
els of support in response to populist 
statements in the news, while individuals 
who oppose the populist ideology develop 
lower levels of support in response to pop-
ulist statements. Taken together, previous 
research seems to suggest that populist 
communication is more persuasive for in-
dividuals with an affinity to populism, and 
that it may even have reversed effects for 
individuals with low populist attitudes. We 
therefore postulate that the effects that we 
assumed in H1 and H2 will depend on in-
dividuals’ populist attitudes. 
 › H3: Persuasive effects of anti-immi-
grant statements, populist statements, 
and populist styles can only be expect-
ed for individuals with strong populist 
attitudes, while no persuasive (or even 
reversed) effects can be expected for 
individuals with low populist attitudes.
2 Methods
To test our hypotheses, we combined data 
from a content analysis and a two-wave 
panel-survey in a linkage-analysis (de 
Vreese et al., 2017; Scharkow & Bachl, 
2017). Based on the self-reported media 
use of the survey participants, we assigned 
individual scores of media content vari-
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ables, reflecting the content participants 
were most likely exposed to. This method 
allows us to investigate the effects of media 
exposure on changes in attitudes toward 
immigrants, support of anti-immigration 
policies, and vote probability for the SVP. 
In order to detect media effects, it is 
important that the media selection for the 
content analysis reflects the media reper-
toires of the survey participants as good as 
possible. Therefore, we decided to focus 
our analysis on the metropolitan region of 
Zurich, consisting of the city of Zurich and 
the encompassing canton of Zurich. This 
focus allows us to include news outlets of 
national as well as regional scope. Further, 
the sample of survey participants still re-
presents a diverse population, living in ur-
ban as well as rural areas and with diverse 
political views. Although the sample may 
not be fully representative of Switzerland, 
the results of recent referenda suggest the 
divide between urban and rural areas be-
comes more prominent, while regional 
differences have decreased2.
2.1 Content Analysis
The content analysis includes a wide se-
lection of news media with a high share in 
the region of Zurich. We included the print 
editions of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung and 
Tages-Anzeiger (quality media), Blick and 
20 Minuten (tabloid media), Winterthurer 
Zeitung and Zürcher Oberländer (region-
al news), Weltwoche and WOZ (weeklies). 
As there is usually a very high consonance 
of print and online edition of newspapers 
(Ghersetti, 2014), we considered the print 
versions also as proxies for the online 
content of those news outlets. Further, we 
included the two most viewed TV news 
shows in Switzerland, the Tagesschau and 
10 vor 10 (both SRF 1). 
We analyzed all those news outlets 
during a period of 59 days in February and 
March 2015 to include the last 30 days of 
news coverage before the second survey 
for each participant. Using a list of 20 key-
words related to migration, we retrieved 
2 As suggested by a data analysis at the EPFL 
Lausanne: https://actu.epfl.ch/news/swiss- 
politics-is-increasingly-dominated-by-an-
urb/ (last visited on June 6, 2018).
2487 articles, 1894 of which referred to mi-
gration politics. From these texts, a sample 
of 965 was drawn for detailed analysis. For 
TV shows, we used artificial weeks and 
manual scanning to identify 34 news sto-
ries on migration. All variables were coded 
on statement levels by a team of 39 trained 
coders and then aggregated on the news 
item. Reliability was assessed between 
coders and between each coder and a gold 
standard provided by the project leaders 
for a subsample of the news items in the 
analysis (Mean agreement: 93.2%; B&P 
Kappa = 0.90).
2.1.2 Measures
For the present study, we measured three 
relevant variables in the media content. 
First, we measured anti-immigrant state-
ments. For each statement about immi-
grants, coders decided if the valence was 
positive or negative, or if promoted pol-
icies were in favor or in opposition of re-
strictions on immigration. We aggregated 
this measure on the news item creating a 
bias variable which indicates if the news 
item in total is more favorable or unfavor-
able toward immigrants. Positive values on 
this variable indicate an anti-immigrant 
bias. Second, we assessed the dominance 
of populist statements over anti-populist 
statements in a similar procedure. State-
ments were coded as populist when they 
reflect one of the populist key messages 
displayed in Table 1, and as anti-populist, 
when they reflect the opposite of these 
ideas (i. e., an elitist or pluralist view). Pos-
itive values on the bias variable indicate 
that the news item contains more pop-
ulist than anti-populist statements. And 
third, we measured the number of popu-
list style elements and aggregated them as 
a sum for each news item. We considered 
emotionalization, dramatization, absolut-
ism and the use of colloquial language as 
populist communication styles (compare 
Table 1). As this count variable is heavily 
skewed (most articles contain no or few 
style elements), it was transformed before 
the statistical analysis by calculating its 
natural logarithm. 
In order to assess if the combination 
of substantial right-wing populist content 
Wirz et al. / Studies in Communication Sciences 19.1 (2019), pp. 69–83 75
with populist style elements increases the 
persuasiveness of populist communica-
tion, we computed two dummy variables 
from these measures: a first one indicat-
ing the co-occurrence of anti-immigrant 
statements and populist style in a news 
item, and a second one indicating the 
co-occurrence of populist statements and 
populist style. Both of these variables have 
the value 1 when a news item has a positive 
value on the bias variable and contains at 
least one style element, and the value 0 if 
these conditions are not met3. 
2.2 Panel Survey
The panel survey was conducted online in 
April 2014 and March 2015. Participants 
were recruited by a professional market 
research company from their online ac-
cess panel using a quota procedure for age 
and gender. 2000 persons participated in 
the first panel wave. Due to the long time 
span between the two waves, about one 
third of the sample dropped out. Further, 
participants in the survey who indicated 
that they do neither read one of the news-
papers (print or online edition) nor watch 
one of the TV news shows in the analysis 
had to be excluded for the purpose of this 
study (n = 88). The final sample consist-
ed of 1172 participants, 46 percent were 
female and the age ranged from 19 to 74 
years with a mean of 52 years. Most par-
ticipants had a medium (51 percent) or 
high (46 percent) education level, while 
the other participants had only mandatory 
education (2 percent) or did not indicate 
their education level (1 percent).
2.2.1 Measures
The panel survey measured the dependent 
and moderator variables of interest for 
this study, as well as the participants’ me-
3 We prefer this dummy coding over an in-
teraction term due to the nature of the bias 
variables: We are interested in the effects 
of populist and anti-immigrant statements 
combined with populist styles compared to 
such statements that are not combined with 
style elements, but we make no assump-
tions about the effects of anti-populist and 
pro-immigrant statements with style ele-
ments.
dia diets. First, anti-immigrant attitudes 
were measured as a latent construct with 
six items representing negative cognitions 
(e. g., “foreigners are criminals”) or nega-
tive emotions (i. e., “When I think of for-
eigners, I feel fear.”) toward immigrants in 
a procedure adapted from Crites, Fabrigar, 
and Petty (1994). Second, the support for 
anti-immigration policies was measured 
as a latent construct with four items (e. g., 
“People from Switzerland should always 
be offered jobs before migrants.”). Scalar 
measurement invariance over time was es-
tablished for both latent constructs. Third, 
the vote probability for the Swiss People’s 
Party was assessed with a single item (How 
likely would you vote for the SVP if elec-
tions were today?). All three dependent 
variables are significantly and positively 
correlated (p < 0.001); anti-immigrant atti-
tudes and the support for anti-immigrant 
policies have a strong correlation (r = 0.86), 
and both latent constructs are moderately 
correlated with vote probability for the SVP 
(r = 0.34 and r = 0.38). Populist attitudes, 
which served as a moderator in this study’s 
analysis and represent the degree of sup-
port for the populist ideology, were mea-
sured with a scale by Schulz et al. (2018). 
This measure consists of 12 items (e. g., 
“MPs in Parliament very quickly lose touch 
with ordinary people.”), that we combined 
in a mean index (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.88) 
and split at the median in order to obtain 
a dichotomous moderator. All items were 
measured with 5-point Likert-type scales 
in both panel waves. 
Participants’ media use was measured 
in a three step procedure using the list fre-
quency technique (Andersen, de Vreese, & 
Albæk, 2016). First, participants indicated 
which channels (print, TV, online) they 
used to get political information. Then, for 
each selected channel, a list of news media 
outlets was presented, from which respon-
dents could select the ones they used at 
least sometimes. In the last step, they were 
presented all selected outlets and asked 
about the frequency of use during a week 
(1 to 7 days). 
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2.3 Linkage Procedure
Based on these self-reported media di-
ets, participants were allocated the media 
content they were most likely exposed to. 
For each variable in the content analysis, 
we created an additive score for all arti-
cles within one medium per day. Partic-
ipants were then allocated a mean score 
of all daily values for each media outlet 
they indicated to use. Outlets that were 
used 1–3 days a week were weighted 0.5 
and outlets used 4–7 days a week were 
weighted 1 for the calculation of the to-
tal daily score for each participant. As a 
result of this procedure, each participant 
was allocated an individual score of the 
overall anti-immigrant bias, populist bias, 
number of style elements, and number of 
articles with a combination of populist or 
anti-immigrant statements with populist 
style. Each of these scores represents the 
individual average exposure per day.
3 Results
First, we report descriptive results for the 
media content that individuals were ex-
posed to. The average news consumer was 
exposed to a very balanced portrayal of 
immigrants, with a bias score close to zero 
(M = -0.09, SD = 0.54). Populist statements 
were slightly dominant over anti-populist 
statements (M = 0.16, SD = 0.54); and close 
Table 2: Regression coefficients of the multi-group structural equation model
Populist Attitudes all                                                            low                                                        high
β p β p β p
Latent variable: Anti-immigrant attitudes t2
Anti-immigrant attitudes t1 0.805 .000 0.777 .000 0.774 .000
Anti-immigration statements 
(bias)
–0.027 .519 –0.046 .403 0.001 .998
Populist statements (bias) 0.049 .353 0.135* .051* –0.030* .753*
Populist style –0.055 .070 –0.029 0.475 –0.071 .169
Anti-immigrant bias  
with populist style
–0.060 .334 –0.131 .100 0.002 .983
Populist bias with populist 
style
0.084 .029 0.040* .428* 0.132* .035*
Latent variable: Support for anti-immigrant policies t2
Support for anti-immigrant 
policies t1
0.969 .000 0.959 .000 0.957 .000
Anti-immigration statements 
(bias)
0.022 .598 0.018 .790 0.035 .619
Populist statements (bias) –0.072 .200 –0.031 .713 –0.155 .085
Populist style 0.006 .845 –0.012 .785 0.041 .408
Anti-immigrant bias with 
populist style
0.128 .037 0.144 .119 0.150 .154
Populist bias with populist 
style
–0.097 .005 –0.159* .004* –0.057* .309*
Latent variable: Support for anti-immigrant policies t2
Vote probability SVP t1 0.844 .000 0.848 .000 0.802 .000
Anti-immigration statements 
(bias)
0.021 .525 0.002 .936 0.043 .395
Populist statements (bias) 0.037 .363 0.007 .899 0.079 .243
Populist style –0.013 .566 –0.009 .781 –0.013 .711
Anti-immigrant bias with 
populist style
0.004 .926 0.071 .307 –0.069 .387
Populist bias with populist 
style
–0.050 .050 –0.074 .030 –0.033 .430
Note. Significant effects are highlighted with gray areas, effects that differ significantly between groups are marked with an asterisk.
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to five style elements were present in a dai-
ly media diet (M = 4.13, SD = 2.29). Further, 
the average news consumer was exposed 
to a combination of anti-immigrant state-
ments and style elements nearly every 
second day (M = 0.48, SD = 0.22); and sim-
ilarly often to a combination of populist 
statements and style elements (M = 0.57, 
SD = 0.31). 
In order to test our hypotheses, we 
first estimated a Structural Equation Mod-
el (SEM) for all participants with the R 
package lavaan (Rosseel, 2011). The theo-
retical model is displayed in Figure 1. It as-
sumes that anti-immigrant attitudes, the 
support for anti-immigration policies and 
the vote probability for the SVP at the time 
of the second panel wave are predicted by 
an auto-regressive effect (i. e., the measure 
of the same construct at the time of the 
first panel wave) and by the media content 
individuals were exposed to in the 30 days 
prior to the second panel wave. Further, 
it assumes that anti-immigrant attitudes, 
the support for anti-immigrant policies, 
and the vote probability for the SVP are 
correlated, both within and across time 
points. The model has an acceptable to 
good fit to the data (Chi2 = 801.36, df = 284, 
CFI: 0.96, TLI: 0.95, RMSEA: 0.04, SRMR: 
0.06), according to the limits defined by 
Hu & Bentler (1999). 
As we assumed differential effects for 
individuals with lower and higher popu-
list attitudes, we also estimated the mod-
el as a Multi-Group SEM. Also this model 
has an acceptable to good fit to the data 
(Chi2 = 1086.64, df = 568, CFI: 0.95, TLI: 
0.94, RMSEA: 0.04, SRMR: 0.05). In order to 
determine if the differences between the 
two groups are statistically significant, we 
used a manifest modelling approach, that 
is a path model in which we included an 
interaction term for each media content 
variable with the measure of populist at-
titudes. The regression coefficients for the 
overall and multi-group estimation are 
both displayed in Table 2. Effects that can 
be considered to be statistically different 
between groups (as there was a significant 
interaction in the path model) are marked 
with an asterisk. 
In a first step, we test H1 and H2 for the 
overall sample. Hypothesis 1 predicted that 
the exposure to right-wing populist content 
would lead to a) more negative attitudes 
toward immigrants, b) higher support of 
anti-immigration policies, and c) increase 
the vote probability of the SVP. There is no 
evidence for any of these effects. H1 a-c 
thus have to be rejected. Hypothesis 2 pre-
dicted that populist style elements would 
increase the persuasiveness of right-wing 
populist content. We found mixed evidence 
Figure 1: Theoretical model depicting the assumed media effects
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
Anti-immigrant bias
Vote probability SVP t1
Anti-
immigrant 
attitude t1
Anti-
immigrant 
attitude t2
Policy
support t1
Policy
support t2
Vote probability SVP t2
Populist content bias
Anti-immigrant bias with style
Populist content bias with style
P1 P2 P3 P4 P1 P2 P3 P4
Note: Correlations between anti-immigrant attitudes, support for anti-immigration policies and SVP vote probability across time are not 
displayed for a better readability.
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for this assumption. Combining populist 
statements with populist styles increased 
negative attitudes toward immigrants, but 
decreased the support for anti-immigrant 
policies and the vote probability for the SVP. 
Anti-immigrant statements combined with 
populist style increased the support for an-
ti-immigrant policies but had no effect on 
anti-immigrant attitudes and vote proba-
bility for the SVP. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that persuasive 
effects of right-wing populist communica-
tion would only occur for individuals with 
high levels of populist attitudes. Although 
there are some significant effects for the 
overall sample, a look at the multi-group 
model suggests that there are indeed dif-
ferential effects depending on the level of 
populist attitudes. First of all, the negative 
effects of populist statements combined 
with populist style can only be found for 
individuals with low populist attitudes. 
For this group, the combination of popu-
list statements with style elements led to 
less support for anti-immigrant policies 
and a lower vote probability for the SVP. 
This is consistent with the expectations in 
H3. Second, the positive effect of populist 
statements with style elements can only be 
found for individuals with high populist 
attitudes. For this group, the combination 
of populist statements with populist style 
led to more negative attitudes toward im-
migrants. This is also consistent with H3. 
The mixed effects that we found for H2 can 
thus largely be explained by participants’ 
populist attitudes.
Surprisingly, the overall effect of anti- 
immigrant statements combined with 
po p u list style is not significant in any of 
the two groups by themselves. On the oth-
er hand, there is an additional effect of 
populist statements (without style) for in-
dividuals with low populist attitudes. The 
more populist statements individuals in 
this group received in their media diet, the 
more negative did their attitudes toward 
immigrants become. This finding supports 
H1a, but contradicts H3, as we did not ex-
pect persuasive effects for individuals with 
low populist attitudes.
All in all, we can conclude that mainly 
the combination of anti-immigrant state-
ments with populist style elements had an 
influence on Swiss citizens’ attitudes. As 
expected, this influence was positive for 
individuals who support the populist ide-
ology, and negative for those who oppose 
it. Further, also populist statements had an 
influence on attitudes toward immigrants, 
however unexpectedly only for individuals 
Figure 2: Overview of results
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
Anti-immigrant bias
Vote probability SVP t1
Anti-
immigrant 
attitude t1
Anti-
immigrant 
attitude t2
Policy
support t1
Policy
support t2
Vote probability SVP t2
Populist content bias
Anti-immigrant bias with style
Populist content bias with style
P1 P2 P3 P4 P1 P2 P3 P4
0.135
0.132
-0.159
-0.159
Effects for individuals with lower levels of populist attidues
Effects for individuals with higher levels of populist attidues
Note: Correlations between anti-immigrant attitudes, support for anti-immigration policies and SVP vote probability across time are not 
displayed for a better readability.
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with low levels of populist attitudes. All sig-
nificant effects are displayed in Figure 2. 
4 Discussion 
Although the Swiss People’s Party has be-
come the largest party in Switzerland, 
there has so far been no systematic anal-
ysis of how right-wing populist commu-
nication influences Swiss citizens’ pref-
erences for the SVP and its policies. One 
important feature of populist communi-
cation is the depiction of the situation as 
a crisis (Moffitt, 2015). It was therefore the 
aim of this study to investigate how the 
exposure to populist crisis rhetoric in the 
news influences citizens’ attitudes toward 
immigrants, anti-immigration policies, 
and the probability to vote for the SVP. 
The results of this study suggest that the 
combination of substantial populist con-
tent with populist style elements, such as 
emotionalization or dramatization, does 
indeed have an impact. In line with previ-
ous research, for example by Müller et al. 
(2017), we found that individuals who 
support the populist ideology are persuad-
ed by the combination of anti-immigrant 
statements with populist style, while indi-
viduals who oppose the populist ideology 
show reversed tendencies. 
Interestingly, we only found effects for 
the combination of anti-immigrant con-
tent with populist style, but not for popu-
list content with populist style. It might be 
that this is related to the concepts we in-
vestigated – it seems reasonable that anti- 
immigrant statements more than populist 
statements influence what people think 
about immigrants and immigration poli-
cies. As immigration is also the main issue 
of the SVP (Dalmus, Hänggli, & Bernhard, 
2016), it may be that reasons to vote or not 
vote for this party are dominated by con-
siderations about the party’s position on 
this issue. Further, one has to keep in mind 
that the effects reflect changes in attitudes 
or vote probability during one year. In this 
context, it is noteworthy that the combi-
nation of anti-immigrant statements with 
populist style affected attitudes toward im-
migrants, but not toward immigration pol-
icies or the vote probability for the SVP for 
individuals with higher populist attitudes, 
while it was just the other way around 
for individuals with lower levels of popu-
list attitudes. This might indicate that the 
proclamation of an immigration crisis is 
perceived as an over-dramatization by in-
dividuals who are not inclined toward the 
populist ideology; it has no effect on their 
attitudes toward immigrants and leads to 
a rejection of the SVP and its policies. For 
individuals who support the populist ideo-
logy on the other hand, the proclamation 
of such a crisis is persuasive, however they 
might support (or not support) the SVP 
and its policies for other reasons.
A surprising result of this study is that 
the exposure to populist statements led 
to more negative attitudes toward im-
migrants for individuals with low popu-
list attitudes. The depiction of a conflict 
between the people and the elite in the 
context of immigration might have in-
creased the perception of immigration as 
a problem for this group, even or probably 
because they usually do not feel betrayed 
by the political elite. It might be that as 
this group rejects a tough anti-immigrant 
rhetoric, other and more subtle arguments 
against immigration are more persuasive 
for them. The effect may also have meth-
odological reasons: Individuals with low 
populist attitudes had significantly less 
negative attitudes toward immigrants than 
individuals with high populist attitudes at 
the first panel wave; considering what is 
known as regression to the mean (Barnett, 
van der Pols, & Dobson, 2005), it might be 
that individuals in this group just report-
ed less extreme attitudes at the time of the 
second panel wave (while however indi-
viduals with high populist attitudes stayed 
as extreme as they were). 
The present research of course has its 
limitations. The linkage analysis is based 
on the assumption that individuals were 
exposed to all articles on the issue of mi-
gration in the media outlets that they use. 
This is a very idealistic assumption. The 
measurement error is further increased 
by the self-report of media use, and by the 
fact that we only analyzed a random sam-
ple of the media content. This might have 
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led to an underestimation of media effects 
(Scharkow & Bachl, 2017). It is therefore 
noteworthy to mention that we did find 
some media effects, despite the potential 
inaccuracy in the assignment of media 
content. The media effects we found are 
only small, which is however not surpris-
ing as we investigate attitude change in a 
panel design. Future research could ad-
dress the problem of measurement error 
by using tracking data for media use, or by 
considering the placement of news items 
(e. g., front page versus other pages) in or-
der to estimate the probability that survey 
participants were exposed to a particular 
news story.
Another limitation is the focus on 
some selected news sources, which of 
course do not reflect the complete media 
repertoire of the population. We analyzed 
TV news and print newspapers, and con-
sidered the latter also as proxies for the 
online outlets. As digital-born news me-
dia still play a minor role in Switzerland 
(Newman, Fletcher, Levy, & Nielsen, 2016), 
this selection reflects the main mass me-
dia news sources of the Swiss population. 
However, especially on social media, indi-
viduals are not only exposed to news from 
established Swiss media, but also to mes-
sages from foreign media, alternative news 
sources, and messages from peers. As this 
exposure is very individual, it will be a big 
challenge for future research to better ac-
knowledge such sources.
The present study focused on the ef-
fects of right-wing populist communi-
cation in the metropolitan region of Zu-
rich and its impact on the support of the 
SVP and its policies. Although the SVP is 
characterized as a textbook example for a 
right-wing populist party, right-wing pop-
ulist communication in the news is not 
limited to this party, and may also affect 
the vote probability for other Swiss par-
ties. It would thus be desirable for future 
research to enhance the scope of analysis. 
Further, in order to enhance the generaliz-
ability of our findings with regard to pop-
ulist parties, similar analyses could also be 
conducted in the area of Geneva with the 
Geneva Citizens Movement (MCG), or in 
Ticino with the Ticino League (Lega). 
Despite its limitations, the present 
study provides some valuable contribu-
tions. First, with a more general scope, this 
research has shown that populist crisis 
rhetoric, that is, the combination of sub-
stantial (right-wing) populist content with 
a populist style, is persuasive for some vot-
er segments, but does backfire for others. 
The combination of populist messages 
with an arousing style is thus not such a 
powerful persuasion tool as some might 
have hoped or feared. However, the results 
of our analysis suggest that also voters who 
rather oppose the populist ideology may 
be persuaded by populist communication, 
although they react to different cues than 
individuals who support the populist ide-
ology. 
Second, with a more specific focus on 
Switzerland, the study at hand is the first 
analysis of the effects of right-wing popu-
list communication in the news on Swiss 
citizens’ attitudes. It shows that drama-
tization in the context of anti-immigrant 
rhetoric had a negative impact on vote 
probability for the SVP and on support of 
anti-immigration policies for voters with 
lower levels of populist attitudes. This is 
noteworthy, as the first panel wave of this 
study took place in 2015, just after the 
Swiss electorate accepted the «Massen-
einwanderungsinitiative», a referendum 
launched by the SVP which demanded the 
limitation of immigration to Switzerland 
through contingents, while the second 
panel wave took place a year later. At the 
moment of writing, the Masseneinwan-
derunginitiative was the last success of 
the SVP on the immigration issue. In 2016, 
the Swiss electorate voted against the 
«Durchsetzungs initivative», which wanted 
to establish stricter rules for the deporta-
tion of foreign criminals. The results of our 
study, which depict the change in attitudes 
toward immigrants and immigration pol-
icies between 2015 and 2016, might pro-
vide some explanation for the diverging 
outcomes of these two referenda. 
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